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I. INTRODUCTION
The justifications given by states that resort to the right of
self-defense, under international law, are often unreasonable. Article
511 of the United Nations Charter (UN Charter) adopts a passive
interpretation of the right of self-defense because it ignores opinio juris
in giving justification to the right of self-defense in international law.
It instead relies strictly on the static and narrow approach of state
practice. In practice, the idea of state practice makes room for
dominant states to create broad interpretations and resort to a use of
force, by characterizing the action as self-defense, under Article 2(4)
of the UN Charter. This resort to the right of self-defense has the
1
U.N. Charter art. 51: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defensce if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defensce shall be immediately reported
to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace
and security.”
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potential to be driven by professionally impeccable legal arguments
that look from rules to a dominant state’s underlying reasons.
As international law suffers from a lack of harmonized
standards in norm-identification – dominant states find room to
pursue their self-interested interpretations in practice. Through this
flaw, dominant actors are potentially capable of putting nondominant states under pressure to keep in pace with their proposals
in practice. If non-dominant actors wish to remain viable on the
international plane and not be subject to a wide range of restrictive
measures, they will find no alternative other than voting for, or
abstaining from, proposals rendered by dominant actors. In other
words, “the major states will always have an influence commensurate
with their status, if only because their concerns are much wider, their
interests much deeper and their power more effective.”2
The hazard of this customary law-Charter puzzle looms large
in the era of the creation of the international core crime of
Aggression in 2017. This state of affairs makes room for dominant
states to tag and taint other non-dominant states with the label of
having committed the crime of Aggression. This article proposes that
there is a necessity to re-conceptualize the right of self-defense in
international law. This task will require an understanding of the basic
definition of the crime of Aggression and its applicability in 2017.
This article is structured in the following order: Part II is
dedicated to both the evolutionary process of the right of selfdefense in international law and also different schools of thought
among international law scholarship in this regard. Part III delves
into the constitutive elements of the crime of Aggression – its actus
reus3 and mens rea4 requirements. This part also puts emphasizes the
intrinsic interconnectedness of the crime of Agression with the right
of self-defense in international law. And Part IV features the final
remarks of the article.

2
3
4

MALCOLM NATHAN SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 156 (7th ed, 2014).
Latin for guilty act.
Latin for guilty mind.
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II. THE GENEALOGY OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law generally prohibits the use of force unless
such an action is borne out of the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense, or is authorized by the Security Council under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Calling for a universal respect
toward the sovereignty of all member states, Article 2 (4)5 of the UN
Charter articulates the prohibition of use of force under international
law. On the other hand, Chapter VII of the UN Charter on “Action
with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and the
Acts of Aggression”, delineates what would constitute an appropriate
response to an actual threat to the peace. Article 51 of Chapter VII
articulates the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in
case of an actual armed attack posed by a rogue entity against any of
the members of the Charter. Thus, “the use of force by one state
against another [on behalf of the fulfillment of the right to individual
or collective self-defense] is one of the most significant foreign policy
decisions that any State can make.”6
Realistically speaking, history has been fraught with
persuading evidence of the reliance of dominant member states on
hard power, under state-centric realistic approaches toward interpolity relations, in order to fulfill their political desires.7 This was
founded upon a Hobbesian approach toward inter-polity relations.
This approach states that there is no super-sovereign on an interpolity plane that may enforce agreements among states, and
therefore, states are recognized as having a legal permission to resort
to war against other states. This is indicative of the fact that the
theory of just war during the 19th century’s international legal
5
U.N. Charter art. 2(4): “All members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations.”
6
Donald R Rothwell, Anticipatory Self-Defence in the Age of International
Terrorism, 24 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 337, 338 (2005).
7
See generally JOHN BAYLIS, STEVE SMITH & PATRICIA OWENS, THE
GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (5th ed., 2013).
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scholarship lacked morality.8 In practice, states applied this approach
to launch war as a prerogative en route to their political and
economic ends.
There have been a plethora of incidents around the world
addressing the right of self-defense, as one of the two justifications
for a legal use of force, recognized in the aftermath of World War II.
But, there is still considerable controversy surrounding a modern
formulation of the customary-Charter nature of the right of selfdefense. In fact, the primary concern is not the legality of the
international laws of self-defense, for it intrinsically is an inherent
right of self-help.9 Rather, the main concern is the extent to which
they apply and “rather springs from a proportionate identification of
the circumstances under which it [the law of self-defense] applies.”10
The extent to which international laws of self-defense apply
has long been conceptually controversial. This issue has been
theorized mainly by two schools of thought: restrictive and nonrestrictive positions.11 Through strictly adhering to the explicit
wording of Article 51 of the UN Charter,12 the restrictive position
conditions the legality of the resort to the right of self-defense on an
actual attack by an adversary. This approach does not allow selfdefense in response to an imminent threat or instant political willformation. Based on international legal positivism, state practice13 is
the major axiom in determining customary laws of self-defense,

For instance see AMOS SHARTLE HERSHEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND DIPLOMACY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (Macmillan, 1906).
8

See David B Kopel, The natural right of self-defense: Heller’s lesson for
the world, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 235, 237 (2008).
10
Eustace Chikere Azubuike, Probing the Scope of Self Defense in International
Law, 17 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 129, 130 (2011).
11
See Leo Van den hole, Anticipatory self-defence under international law, 19 AM.
U. INT’L L. REV. 69 (2003).
12
”Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations . . . “. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
13
To read about state practice and opinio juris see respectively SHAW, supra
note 2, at 48, 52.
9
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devoid of either opinio juris14 or moral standards. Article 38(1)(b) of
the International Court of Justice’s statute defines customary law as
“General Practice” accepted as law and gives no weight to the role of
opinio juris.15 Strictly adhering to the notion of state practice in
international norm-making, positivist thinkers give a static, statecentric approach towards customary international law. So, under
Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ, custom, based on state practice, may serve
as law and justify any course of action that complies with the general
practice accepted as law.
On the other hand, the non-restrictive position sheds light on
the importance of the instant custom and circumstantial realities
shaping political will-formation rather than the actual armed attack
launched by an adversary. This school of thought theoretically
justifies the anticipatory self-defense under the notion of opinio juris,
that does not necessarily comply with the wording of Article 51 and
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.16 Based on this understanding, in the
wake of weapons of mass destruction that are mostly instantly
deliverable, the fulfillment of the anticipatory self-defense is
inevitable and even necessary to avoid being destroyed by instant
deliverables.17 In other words, subjecting the right of self-defense to
the actual armed attack by an adversary sounds irrational since actual
attacks via devastating weapons of mass destruction will leave no
time and capability for the state to respond and defend its territorial
integrity. Therefore, the strict adherence of Article 51 of the UN
Charter to the idea of state practice is in contrast with the inevitable
and incontrovertible necessity of coping with instantly deliverable
weapons of mass destruction before an actual armed attack by an
adversary.

14
Special state of mind of the actors on the basis of their intuitive grounds
that shapes customary international law.
15
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38 ¶ 1, June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1153, 1187.
16
See Natalino Ronzitti, The Expanding Law of Self-Defense, 11 J. CONFLICT
& SECURITY L. 343 (2006).
17
See Kalliopi Chainoglou, Reconceptualising Self-Defence in International Law,
18 KING’S L. J. 61 (2007).
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It is worthwhile to note that there has been controversy over
the constituent elements of custom among scholars. Customary rules
of law remain among the least definable concepts in national and
international legal theories, though they remain as the building block
of law in both spheres. “The critiques over the formation of
customary law have been around for more than half a millennium.
There is, if you will, no settled customary practice governing how to
define customary rules of law.”18 Based on the Orthodoxian
approach towards the nature of custom in international law, ‘custom
is itself non-law (or pre-law) but can be a source of law when it is
formalized and rationalized’.19 Based on this approach, custom is
composed of state practice – behavioral patterns or opinio juris – and
the subjective source or state of mind of the actor, or a rational
combination of both, calling for a more reasonable and fit notion of
customary law that lays out a reconciliation theory amidst the abovestated debate.20
In light of international law’s critique of indeterminacy,
perplexity in international legal norm-identification,21 and improper
function of international courts and tribunals in seeking to give
weight and effect to identified values, states are gifted with leeway to
act as judges in their own cause.22 This stream has provided them
with the opportunity to render broad interpretations of the right of
self-defense in international law and “legitimize” their military
movements. This is why in the history of inter-polity relations,
numerous non-defensive wars have been waged on non-aggressor

18
Emily Kadens and Ernest A Young, How Customary Is Customary
International Law, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 885, 911 (2012).
19
Nicole Roughan, Democratic Custom v International Customary Law, 38
VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 403, 410 (2007).
20
Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757 (2001).
21
See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (2005).
22
Gonçalo de Almeida Ribeiro, Judicial Activism and Fidelity to Law, in
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 39 (Luís Pereira Coutinho et al. eds., 2015).
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states, validated by the language of preemption but not empirically or
even reasonably persuasive.23
A. Restrictive Position towards the Right of Self-Defense in
International Law
1. The Theoretical Root
A Positivistic approach toward international law had
overwhelmingly been adopted following the dominance of
empiricism in the Renaissance whereby “[law] was concerned not
with an edifice of theory structured upon deductions from absolute
principles, but rather with viewing events as they occurred and
discussing actual problems that had arisen.”24 “Positivist Philosophy
restricts the object of scientific knowledge to matters that can be
verified by observation, and thus excludes from its domain all matters
of an a priori, metaphysical nature.”25 So, the main pillar of positivistic
legal philosophy is empiricism. The classical international legal
positivism that was the dominant approach during the 19th and 20th
centuries, has ostensibly become loose with resurgence of natural law
theories.26 In the wake of the critical analysis of the religious ideology
on the one hand, and the over-arching progress of the empirical
observations on the other, a changeover in legal theory occurred. In
the realm of international legal theory, positivism regained its

As an example of such misinterpretations was reflected in the so-called
Bush doctrine. Following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. administration responded to
pressure calling for a more offensive posture against so-called rogue troops by
sending military troops and launching military attacks against military and nonmilitary people of Iraq in 2003. The Bush doctrine [which was formulated under
the notion of instant custom] challenged even the idea of preventive war.
According to the “Bush doctrine”, the reactive nature of the right of self-defense
turns into an active one even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the
enemy’s attack.
24
SHAW, supra note 2, at 18.
25
Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 AM.
J. INT’L L. 260, 261 (1940).
26
See id. at 262-68.
23
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importance among scholars27 inspired by Hans Kelsen’s “Pure
Theory of Law.”28
Central to international legal positivism is what states do or
consent to do, not what they ought to do. In other words,
“[International legal positivism’s] essentialist positions follow from
the problem of order amongst sovereigns, an order binding them.
States are the original, pre-legal subjects of international law and an
order binding them cannot come into being without or against their
will.”29 Based on this value-free, conduct-based approach, only those
norms which are generated by a man-made set of legal procedures are
recognized as law, independent of any moral or inherent value. These
arguments are mostly influenced by “the general realist thesis that
based upon that, political morality does not reach beyond the
boundaries of the state, or that only a very minimalist morality
does.”30
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was one of the most wellknown thinkers who injected positivistic approach, based on egoism,
into the laws of war.31 Morality, according to Hobbes, is an
agreement between a sovereign and people living under that
sovereignty. Through this agreement, people who are acting wholly
on behalf of their self-interest, state their content-independent
willingness to comply with the rules established by the sovereign.32
So, to Hobbes, morality is a man-made creature enforced by a superpower sovereign not given from a supernatural entity, such as God,
or from nature itself. He transmitted this standpoint from his
thoughts on domestic legal theory to the theories on the laws of war
in inter-polity relations. In the absence of a super-sovereign in the
Augusto Zimmermann, Evolutionary Legal Theories: The Impact of Darwinism
on Western Conceptions of Law, 24 J. CREATION 108, 111 (2010).
28
See generally HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans.,
Univ. Cal. Press 1967) (1934).
29
Jörg Kammerhofer, International Legal Positivism, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 411 (2016).
30
Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas, Introduction: The Emergence of the
Philosophy of International Law, in PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3
(Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010).
31
See McMahan, supra note 30, at 494-95.
32
Id.
27
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international sphere to enforce agreements among sovereigns, “states
could not be morally constrained in their relations with each other.”33
The Hobbesian approach gives room for dominant stateactors to establish a prerogative to resort to war when they find it
necessary for their interests. The Hobbesian account on the laws of
war was dominant during the 19th and 20th centuries´ expansionism.
The most invidious aftermaths of this approach were World Wars I
and II, that faded in significance the theory of jus ad bellum34 -- a
theory conditioning the legitimacy of launching a war against a state
to a non-contentious just cause – and shifted in shedding light on the
importance of the theory of jus in bello35 – laws on wartime conduct of
the states engaging in a war. A piece by Amos Hershey in 1906
provides a clear picture of this realistic understanding under the
influence of the Hobbesian account on laws of war:
”International law does not consider the justice or
injustice of a war. From a purely legal standpoint, all
wars are neither just nor unjust. International law
merely takes cognizance of the existence of war as a
fact, and prescribes certain rules and regulations
which affect the rights and duties of neutrals and
belligerents during that continuance.”36
2. The Restrictive Position
Positivism dispenses with moral weight and refutes
unprecedented current customary understandings on what ought to
be in international law. This idea is mostly inspired by Hart’s claim
that informal and unofficial norms and authority structures are prone
to inertia and anomy since they lack “secondary rules” that are

Id. at 495.
See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT
WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 63 (5th ed. 2015).
35
See generally PAUL CHRISTOPHER, Problems for International Law, in THE
ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL AND MORAL ISSUES
104-14 (3d ed. 2004).
36
HERSHEY, supra note 8, at 67.
33
34
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adapting norms to changing circumstances.37 This follows from the
principal positivist understanding that states are [considered] both
principal producers and principal consumers of international law.38
Based on that, the legitimacy of the fulfillment of the right of selfdefense in international law is restricted to an actual attack by the
adversary or aggressor.
Based on what is posited in Article 51 of the UN Charter, the
use of self-defense should be preceded by an actual armed attack by
an adversary.39 Strictly adhering to the wording of Article 51 of the
UN Charter, one cannot give legitimacy to the fulfillment of the right
of self-defense in response to an imminent but not actual threat by an
adversary. In other words, according to the Charter’s nature or
restrictive position, the right of self-defense must be exercised only
when one state objectively launches an attack against another. Given
this, only a just-in-time defense could be legitimate in international
law and covered by Article 51 and Article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter, and therefore, any interpretative method of norm
identification on the basis of opinio juris such as preemptive selfdefense is illegitimate.
Although a restrictive position may, at least in theory, remain
a hurdle against illegitimate war creation in the international sphere, it
is incapable of coping with weapons of mass destruction that are
mostly instant deliverables. Reasonably, a state-actor must be capable
of suppressing armed attacks before being devastated by these
horrible weapons.40 This is why the non-restrictive position has
gained greater momentum in the age of proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction.

See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 91-99 (3d ed. 2012).
See generally ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, THE INTERPRETATION OF
ACTS AND RULES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (2008).
39
See Russell Powell, The Law and Philosophy of Preventive War: An InstitutionBased Approach to Collective Self-Defence, 32 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 67 (2007).
40
See Kalliopi Chainoglou, Reconceptualising Self-Defence in International Law,
18 K.L.J. 61, 76 (2007).
37
38
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B. The Non-Restrictive Position towards the Right of Self-Defense
in International Law
1. The Theoretical Root
Based on natural law theory, law, as an innate endowment,
can be likened to the science of language that is a precious
endowment bestowed upon mankind. This endowment is illuminated
in practice by making different meaningful sounds through a wellorganized man-made process on the basis of association, analogy,
and correspondence. Law, similarly, in its very essence, is a natural
innate endowment bestowed on mankind, and comes into practice
through man-made institutions and constitutions on the basis of
motives and purposes of the consent which constituted them.
“Natural law refers to rules and principles deducible from nature,
reason or the idea of justice,”41 but in order for that to be
implemented, it must be constituted by man. In other words, “It is
undoubtedly true that the great body of the law is founded upon the
dictates of the right reason, natural justice, and common sense.”42 So,
the very nature and end of law is reasoning, logical fitness, and
reasonableness.
“The doctrine of the law of nature – first practically utilized
in the administration of justice by the Roman jurists – whose
primordial elements are uniformity, simplicity, harmony, and equality,
and whose broadening influence upon the jurisprudence of the world
has been so potent and permanent, is the doctrine of intrinsic
reasonableness . . . It consists of a body of precepts which satisfy, and
are in accord with, right human reason, and which are binding on all
mankind by virtue of their inherent reasonableness.”43 But
considering law, including international law, as a natural bestowment
that can only be progressed through a participatory consent (custom),
traces back to the writings of Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), a
Spanish theologian, in his Treaties on Laws and God the Lawgiver, in
ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVIL, NATURAL AND CUSTOMARY LAW 71
(2008), http://www.zaoerv.de/68_2008/68_2008_1_a_69_110.pdf.
42
Le Baron Bradford Colt, Law and Reasonableness, 37 AM. L. REV. 657, 658
(1903).
43
Id. at 662.
41
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which he “equated the law of nations with custom.”44 Based on this,
jurisprudence and law, as sciences, consider their rules only as having
their existence and authority by the appointment and institution of
humanity, and refer to their fundamental causes as found in nature,
only to explain their meaning and the extent of the power with which
they were instituted.
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), the founder of international law,
first thought of applicability of moral and legal norms outside the
polity.45 “For Grotius the law naturally provided both language and a
mechanism for the systematic application of reason to problems
social order and conflict”46 as well as complexities in inter-polity legal
order. Accordingly, “[for Grotius] rights to self-defense, and certain
property rights and contractual rights (all capable of being vested in
individuals, sovereign states, and other entities), were embedded in
Grotius’ natural law and applicable beyond [the territory of] any given
polity.”47 Moreover, Grotius identified international law completely
with the law of nature that echoes morality, reasonableness, and
equity above and in advance of any posited statutory letters of law.48
What states actually ought to do and the customs they ought
to take into account are the inherent and key rule of the law of
nature. What entails “ought to” is the common sense, driven by the
common morality, of the community within which the law serves.
This is why “theories of natural law are reflective critical accounts of
the constitutive aspects of the well-being and fulfillment of human
persons and the communities they form.”49 As a result, the stance of
morality in natural law theory towards international law is of central
importance. But the important question is how these moral values
Kadens et al., supra note 12, at 887.
See HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE: DE JURE BELLI AC
PACIS LIBRI TRES, 3, (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925).
46
See BENEDICT KINGSBURY, A GROTIAN TRADITION OF THEORY AND
PRACTICE: GROTIUS, LAW, AND MORAL SKEPTICISM IN THE THOUGHT OF
HEDLEY BULL 11, 11 (1997), https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent
.cgi?article=5584&context=faculty_scholarship.
47
Besson & Tasioulas, supra note 30, at 44.
48
See SHAW, supra note 2, at 18.
49
Robert P. George, Natural Law, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 172
(2008).
44
45
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could be regulated and practically used in the international normmaking process. Morally structured principles backed by
philosophical notions are the missing keys in sketching international
legal order and moral “ought to’s” in international law. This viewpoint
has best been approached by Immanuel Kant’s account of
international law.
Based on the above-stated argument, the focal tenet of
natural law is to bring existing rules into harmony with new, everchanging and probably unprecedented public or political sentiments
under the formats of moral principles backed by philosophical
notions. The criterion of reasonableness is best reflected in the
Kantian approach towards international law. One of the tenets of the
Kantian approach towards international law is that “international law
must be institutionally designed to ensure the peaceful settlement of
disputes.”50
Kant, with his idea of perpetual peace, “intended to offer a
programmatic formula for peace, rather than a philosophical analysis
of the nature of international law and relations.”51 His approach was
an attempt to pragmatically implement moral orders in relations
among states. In sketching a moral sphere for states, he stresses the
necessity of taking into account all reasonable measures in coping
with adversaries.52 Therefore, he dismisses the vindication of any
sense of just-war in international relations and persists on referring to
philosophical notions of reasonableness and pragmatically
implementing them as tenets of a just world order toward
international law.53
After the resurgence of the natural law theory in international
legal order following World War II, morality has begun to be
considered as a kernel in the international law agenda based on a
transition from a state-centric global governance to one based on
Patrick Capps, The Kantian Project in Modern International Legal
Theory,12 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 1003, 1003 (2001).
51
Fernando R. Teson, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 53, 57 (1992).
52
Id.
53
Id.
50
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human quest and humane anxiety.54 Therefore, many proposals have
been rendered by academia for a newly evolved international law
agenda calling for a world order based on equality, morality, and
justice.
2. The Non-Restrictive Position
The proponents of the non-restrictive position shed light on
the word “inherent” in the initial sentence of Article 51 of the UN
Charter: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense . . . “ They consider the
right of self-defense to be an innate and morally justifiable right that
cannot be nullified by any means, even by the UN Charter.55 In fact,
they consider the right of self-defense as a natural endowment
bestowed upon member states that come into practice through a
man-made process on the basis of association, analogy, and
correspondence. This naturally indispensable fact can be gleaned
from the comment of the Secretary-General regarding the report by
the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes in 2005:
“Imminent threats are fully covered by Article 51, which safeguards
the inherent right of sovereign States to defend themselves against
armed attack. Lawyers have long recognized that this covers
imminent attack as well as one that has already happened.”56
Based on this position, once a state actor is morally and
politically convinced to resort to force in fulfillment of the right of
self-help, it becomes a custom, based on opinio juris, and renders it as
a norm in international law. So, the non-restrictive position does not
require a state to suffer from the fearsome consequences of an actual
armed attack before it can seek to defend itself from further attacks.
This position accepts that a state anticipates the attack and acts in
54
See RICHARD A. FALK, TOWARD HUMANE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE:
RHETORIC, DESIRE, AND IMAGINARIES GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, GLOBAL
GOVERNMENT: INSTITUTIONAL VISIONS FOR AN EVOLVING WORLD SYSTEM
(2012).
55
See Ronzitti, supra note 16.
56
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (UNITED NATIONS), IN LARGER
FREEDOM: TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT, SECURITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS FOR ALL,
(UN Doc A/59/2005 (‘in larger Freedom’), 33 item 124, 2005).
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such a manner as to preemptively neutralize the threat posed by the
aggressor state. Therefore, this position justifies the use of selfdefense once a threat has become imminent but before an actual
blow from an adversary has been executed.
In the wake of the instant deliverables that have in most cases
been instant, overwhelming, and left no moment for deliberation for
the victim state, a natural desire of preemptive self-help has inevitably
been set forth as a pragmatically reasonable interpretation of the
international right of self-defense. The proponents of this standpoint
argue that the first judicial articulation of anticipatory self-defense
was pronounced in 1842 Caroline Case,57 which occurred long before
the UN Charter came into existence. The advocates of this claim
articulated a three-pronged criterion of immediacy, necessity, and
proportionality as characters of a legitimate fulfillment of the
anticipatory self-defense in international law.
Given this, it has been argued that because of the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a just-in-time defense
may not work in an age of instant deliverables.58 Therefore, a state, or
the elites of that state, are naturally entitled to do their best so as to
not be harmed by their adversaries.59 Based upon this interpretation,
anticipatory self-defense appears to be fully consistent with the
nature of the right of self-help. In other words, the right of self57
In 1837, settlers in Upper Canada rebelled against the British colonial
government. The United States remained officially neutral about the rebellion, but
American sympathizers assisted the rebels with men and supplies, transported by a
steamboat named the Caroline. In response, a British force from Canada entered
United States territory at night, seized the Caroline, set the ship on fire, and sent it
over Niagara Falls. At least one American was killed. The British claimed that the
attack was an act of self-defense. In a letter to the British Ambassador, Secretary of
State Daniel Webster argued that a self-defense claimant would have to show that
the necessity of self-defense was instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means, and no moment of deliberation, and that the British force, even supposing
the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the territories of the United
States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the
necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within
it.
58
See Chainoglou, supra note 40, at 76.
59
See William H. Taft IV, International Law and the Use of Force, 36 GEO. J.
INT’L L. 659, 659-62 (2004).
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defense must be early enough to preclude devastation and gross harm
and therefore, true anticipation is attached to the very process of selfdefense.”60
As stated above, the non-restrictive position relies on the
notion of opinio juris in legitimizing empirically unprecedented and
instant customary international law. Under the dominance of the
interpretative methods of norm identification, opinio juris, state
practice, for the most part, retains merely an auxiliary function to
determine opinio juris.61 For instance, in the field of international
human rights, certain obligations such as the prohibition of genocide
and slavery are universally known as customary norms without any
constitutive reference to state practice or any precedential behavioral
patterns.62 Koskenniemi argues that it is really our certainty that
genocide or torture is illegal that allows us to understand state
behavior and to accept or reject its legal message, not state behavior
itself.63 This is why conditioning the identification of norms
concerning fundamental moral principles on state practice is deemed
inappropriate.64
Based on the notion of instant custom, broad and permissive
interpretations of the right of self-defense came into being based on
the specific state of mind of the politically dominant actors when
interpreting the law which did not necessarily comply with the
wording of Article 51 and Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.65 This has
resulted in an unfathomable confusion about the dual customaryCharter nature of the right of self-defense.66 In practice, some legally
William. H. Taft, The Legal Basis for Preemption (2002) Council on
Foreign Relations Memorandum: 17 November 2005. N 45. 333,
http://zionadvocate.com/the-legal-basis-for-preemption/.
61
See Niels Petersen, Customary Law without Custom-Rules, Principles, and the
Role of State Practice in International Norm Creation, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 275 (2007)
62
See Martti Koskenniemi, The Pull of the Mainstream, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1946
(1990).
63
Id.
64
See Petersen, supra note 61.
65
See Ronzitti, supra note 16.
66
See Terry D Gill, The Temporal Dimension of Self-Defense: Anticipation, PreEmption, Prevention and Immediacy, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT:
EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES 113, 113 (Michael N. Schmitt et al. eds., 2007)
60
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untenable instances of the fulfillment of the right of self-defense,
such as the so-called “Bush Doctrine,” were the result of such broad
interpretations that relied on instant custom. This is why many
scholars have argued that this natural and inevitable understanding of
the right of self-defense, without a regulatory criterion in
international law, may result in unreasonable and irrecoverable
incidents67 and potentially will result in departure from strict rules of
law.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL CORE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
In June 2010 in Kampala, Uganda, states party to the
International Criminal Court (ICC) agreed to make amendments to
the Rome Statute and bring the international core crime of
Aggression within the court’s jurisdiction, beginning in 2017.68 In
detail, the Resolution, RC/Res.6, states that these amendments enter
into force in accordance with Article 121.5 of the Rome Statute,
meaning for each ratifying state individually, one year after the
deposit of its instrument of ratification or acceptance.69 For the Court
to actively exercise jurisdiction over the crime of Aggression,
however, the amendments stipulate additional conditions: the
amendments must have been ratified or accepted for one year by at
least thirty State Parties, and in addition State Parties must “activate”
the Court’s jurisdiction through an additional decision to be taken on
or after January 1, 2017 by a two-thirds majority.70
The international core crime of Aggression, defined in Article
8 of the Rome Statute of the ICC,71 is essentially the offense of using
See Carl-Friedrich Stuckenberg, Problems of “subjective imputation” in domestic
and international criminal law, 12 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. J. 311 (2014).
68
ROME STATUTE REVIEW CONFERENCE - KAMPALA,
UGANDA, 31 May- 11 June 2010
69
Resolution RC/Res.6, Adopted at the 13th plenary meeting, on 11 June
2010, by consensus.
70
See Roger S Clark, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court Considered at the first Review Conference on the Court, Kampala, 31 May 11 June 2010, 2 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 689 (2010).
71
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, signed on 17 July
1998. Article 8:
67
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force against another state without justification under international
law. In detail, the actus resus of the international core crime of
Aggression is the unlawful use of force which is rejected by the rules
of international law. Moreover, the perpetrator and the victim of this
crime are limited to states. The mens rea of this crime is an
intentionally illegal use of force with a particular intention to
encroach victim state’s territory. In result, the international core crime
of Aggression is merely committable by states against states. In other
words, under the auspices of this definition, the international core
crime of Aggression is a leadership crime, thus not applying to

1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the planning,
preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise
control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of
aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation
of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means the use of armed
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations. Any of the following acts, regardless of a
declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly
resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion
or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or
part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another
State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another
State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine
and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another
State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions
provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory
beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal
of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression
against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.
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ordinary soldiers and other individuals.72 Moreover, only certain acts
amount to the international core crime of Aggression, namely to the
extent that the act “by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”73
As elaborated above, there has been an unfathomable and
unresolved controversy over the customary-Charter puzzle of selfdefense in international law. Given the prevalence of positivistic
interpretations on the very nature of customary law and also the right
of self-defense in international law, use of force (Article (2) (4) of the
UN Charter) has been legitimized only on behalf of defensive
purposes. In other words, “Article 2(4) of the UN Charter places
some limitations on the use of force by states in the everyday conduct
of their international relations, without however going so far as to
prohibit states from maintaining standing armies for purely defensive
purposes.”74 However, if a state uses military force, and by doing so
aggresses the territorial integrity of another state, without resorting a
justificatory mean such as the right of self-defense, it can be
prosecuted for committing the international core crime of Aggression
as of 2017.75 This is why “the crime of Aggression is extremely
controversial.”76
The indeterminate terms “gravity”, “character”, and “scale”
in the explicit wording of Article 8 of the Rome Statute have been
subject to controversy among scholars.77 “Gravity” and “scale” may
point to the extent of an armed attack, and thus exclude mere border
incursions of the type frequent in anti-terrorist warfare beyond
borders.78 “Character” seems to be a vaguer term; it seems to leave

72
See Andreas Paulus, Second thoughts on the crime of aggression, 20 EUR. J.
INT’L. L. 1117 (2009).
73
See supra note 62.
74
Rothwell, supra note 6, at 338.
75
See supra note 74.
76
Michael P Scharf, Universal Jurisdiction and the Crime of Aggression, 53 HARV.
INT’L L. J. 357, 359 (2012)
77
See Paulus, supra note 73.
78
See Christian J Tams, The use of force against terrorists, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L.
359 (2009).
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room for arbitrary interpretations of what the term “character”
entails.79
These terms seem to be useful in distinguishing between
committing the international core crime of Aggression and
interventionism calling for humanitarian assistance. “Recent attempts
to legalize humanitarian intervention seem to have failed: while
attempting a codification of sorts of the concept of the ‘responsibility
to protect’, the UN Summit of 200580 clearly reserved the reaction to
the non-observance of the responsibility of states to protect their
populations from war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic
cleansing, and genocide, to the UN, in particular the Security
Council.”81 What marks the distinction between humanitarian and
pro-democratic interventionism and the international core crime of
Aggression is the specific mens rea of the latter that is deductible from
the gravity, scale, and character of the crime committed.
A. Aggression or Self-Defense?
As described above, the right of self-defense, as one of the
two justifications of the legality of the use of force, is under deeprooted conceptual doubt. Any misuse of the right of self-defense by
state actors forms the actus reus of the crime of Aggression. So, the
right of self-defense being arbitrarily interpreted can, in practice, lead
to devastating consequences, as of 2017, which marks the creation of
the crime of Aggression under ICC jurisdiction.
For example, if state “A” misinterprets the anticipatory
perspective of the right of self-defense and uses force against the
territorial integrity of state “B” on the basis of a non-imminent
threat, the aggressor state will scape justice and responsiveness before
any criminal court including ICC. So, in the wake of the customaryCharter perplexity of the right of self-defense in international law, the
See supra note 83.
2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc A/RES/60/1 (2005), at ¶139;
see also SC Res. 1674 (2006), at ¶ 4; SC Res 1706 (2006), at preambular ¶ 2;
implementing the responsibility to protect see SG report, 12 Jan. 2009, A/63/677
(2009), at ¶ 9–10.
81
See Paulus, supra note 73, at 1122.
79
80
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practical existence of the crime of Aggression, to a large extent,
would be affected by arbitrariness and bewilderment. Moreover, this
will make room for the dominant political actors to tag legally tenable
resorts to the right of self-defense with the crime of “Aggression” on
the basis of their own political interests.
Human conduct is intrinsically constituted and driven by
subjective presuppositions and premises, or the state of mind of the
actor. Aristotle’s account of practical syllogism82 can be construed as
providing a statement of natural conditions for intelligible human
action and doing so in a way that must hold for any recognizably
human culture.83 Based on this universal concept, the primary
element of any act in any sphere is the state of mind of the actor or
the subjective element.
Based on this universal concept on human conduct, no one
can refute the special state of mind of the actors, opinio juris, in times
of being threatened by a potential adversary that is imminently about
to launch a military attack. Given this, it is intrinsically
incontrovertible and correct to prioritize the subjective element or
special state of mind of the actors in international laws of selfdefense. Therefore, broad, instant, and self-interested interpretations
The Nicomachean Ethics is the name normally given to Aristotle’s bestknown work on ethics. The work, which plays a pre-eminent role in defining
Aristotelian ethics, consists of ten books. This work was written Between 334 and
323 B.C. See BARTLETT, ROBERT C, AND COLLINS, SUSAN D., ARISTOTLE’S
NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS: A NEW TRANSLATION (2011).
83
Aristotle’s account of Practical Syllogism is briefly touched as following:
I. Presupposed will -- intentions and goals that are presupposed but not expressed
by the principal – such as believing in the fact that a state has the right to defend
itself,
II. Major premise -- a universal truth or a moral maxim on a specific matter – such
the fact that use of force can be permitted in case of fulfillment of the right of selfdefense, whether this right be legitimized by instant custom or Charter,
III. Minor premise -- a particular truth or instance covered by the major premise –
such as the instance that the adversary state (A) is launching an actual attack against
state (B), or has shown its willingness to use WMD. So, State (B) has the right to
defend its territorial integrity and public security, whether it be legitimized by
instant custom or Charter,
IV. Conclusion – the imperative action – such as when State (B) fulfills its right to
self-defense.
82
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on behalf of the right of self-defense under the category of
anticipatory self-defense are inherently inevitable. This is a natural
extension that is fully consistent with universal propensity of not
being harmed by even a potential adversary.
As stated above, in the absence of a written law valuing, and
at the same time regulating opinio juris in international laws of selfdefense, customary international law, primarily based on opinio juris, is
of intrinsic priority in recognizing the legitimate fulfillment of the
right of self-defense. But given the indeterminacy of international
law, there are profound critiques on the nature of customary
international law itself, for it makes opinio juris rather hazardous that
makes room for dominant international actors to act on their own
cause and remain unquestioned. And this has the potential for
misinterpretations regarding the actus reus of the international core
crime of Aggression before criminal courts. In other words, although
this crime has been directed to bring aggressor states before criminal
courts, given the customary-Charter puzzle of the right of selfdefense, the crime of Aggression sounds like a new pretext for more
wars under new headings. This is why this research is aimed at
necessitating the conceptual re-thinking of the right of self-defense
prior to practically bringing the crime of Aggression under the
jurisdiction of the ICC in 2017.
IV. CONCLUSION
The explicit wording of Article 51 of the UN Charter is
completely in contrast to the natural and logical process of human
conduct. Article 51 of the UN Charter conditions the legitimacy of
the fulfillment of the right of self-defense to an actual armed attack
objectively launched by the adversary. This huge flaw has resulted in
various interstate hostilities and a transparent departure from the rule
of law on behalf of the fulfillment of the right of self-defense.
On the other hand, arguably, opinio juris is central to the very
structure of the right of self-defense as a human (re)action.
Therefore, Article 51 of the UN Charter remains theoretically
dysfunctional. This has provided a deep-rooted perplexity on the
nature and legitimate practice of the right of self-defense in
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international law. Thus, in the current international legal structure,
the international right of self-defense suffers from a conceptual
deficit that makes the actus reus of the international core crime of
Aggression highly indeterminate.
Based on the main argument of this article, it is extremely
crucial for the international law-making apparatus to re-think the
conceptual flaws of the right of self-defense before giving practical
weight to the crime of Aggression. The reason for this is that the
right of self-defense in international law and the crime of Aggression
are intrinsically interconnected. Any malpractice on behalf of the
fulfilment of the right of self-defense in international law forms actus
reus of the international core crime of Aggression which, based on the
Article 8 of the ICC Rome Statute, is merely committable by states
against states. Therefore, the customary-Charter puzzle of the right
of self-defense, coupled with the practice of the international core
crime of Aggression as of 2017, provides room for an indeterminate
and misinterpreted account of the crime of Aggression.
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